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HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE STUDENT UNREST
PROVISIONS
In 1844, a Vermont judge refused to hold that a child could compel his
father to provide him with a college education on the grounds that the
child's peers did not have a college education and that such an education
would not substantially benefit the boy.1 Today, that judge's premises would
require the opposite holding,2 i.e., the father would be compelled-if he
had the means and the child had the ability-to provide his child with a
college education. Ever increasing technology has turned the college de-
gree into a passport to the managerial labor force.3 Thus, for children
whose parents are financially able to provide them with a college educa-
tion, the legal recognition of a right to a higher education guarantees these
children an opportunity to attend college.' But what about those children
who have the ability to attend college, yet whose parents are financially
unable to provide them with it? Former President Lyndon B. Johnson's
"Great Society" attempted to equalize the educational opportunities of rich
and poor children.5 One method was the Higher Education Act of 19650
which provided federal financial assistance to the colleges and universities7
-and most importantly to the students.' The 1965 education legislation
was designed to increase federal assistance to education but without a par-
allel increase in federal control of education.' Yet, in the Higher Educa-
tion Amendments of 196810 and in several of the educational appropria-
1 Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt. *683, *686 (1844).
2See Note, College Education as a Legal Necessity, 18 VAND. L REV. 1400 (1965). This
article discusses the legal obligation of the divorced father to provide his child with a college
education. It notes the fact that this obligation is not imposed upon non-divorced fathers. This
is so because of the court's policy against judicial interference with parental authority. The non-
divorced father, the court assumes, will provide his child with all the necessities and luxuries
the child needs and the family can afford. In the majority of cases, this assumption is true.
Id. at 1400-07. Therefore the court's do not deny the child of a non-divorced father the right
to a college education, but only acquiesces in the father's determination that either the child does
not have the ability to attend college or the father does not have the funds to send the child to
school. See also U.N. THE UNIvERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Art. 26.
3 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 150 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961) (college is neces-
sary to earn an adequate livelihood and to perform the duties and responsibilities of good citi-
zenship); Soglin v. Kauffman, 395 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
4 See the qualifications on this statement set out in note 2 supra
5 Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson's Educational Messages of 1965 and 1968, New York Times,
Jan. 13, 1965, at 20, Col. 2; New York Times, Feb. 6, 1968, at 26, col. 1.
6 79 Stat. 1219 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq. (Supp. 1968).
7 Library Assistance, tt. II, 79 Stat. 1224 (1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1021 (Supp.
1968); Educational Professional Development, tit. V, 79 Stat. 1254 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 1091
et seq. (Supp. 1968); Financial Assistance for the Improvement of Undergraduate Institutions,
tit. VI, 79 Stat. 1261 (1965),as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1121 et. seq. (Supp. 1968).
8 Student Assistance, it. IV, 79 Stat. 1232 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 1061 (Supp. 1968).
9 See New York Times, March 23, 1969, at 54, col. 2.
10Tit. V § 504, 82 Stat. 1062 (1968), 20 U.S.C.A. § 1060 (Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited
as H. E. Amends].
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tion acts,'1 Congress, as a response to the turmoil on American campuses,
included provisions discontinuing aid to students involved in campus
disturbances. Educators and civil libertarians forcefully denounced the
legislation, brandishing the Constitutional shibboleths of vagueness, chill-
ing effect, and lack of due process. This strong reaction contains an air
of superficiality which suggests the need for a careful consideration of the
values represented by these constitutional doctrines in light of the alleged
legislative infringements.
The Higher Education Act of 1965 was not the first federal act to give
direct financial assistance to students or to the educational institutions.
The Servicemen's Readjustment Act (GI bill),"2 the National Science
Foundation 13 and the National Defense Education Act 4 were the proto-
type statutes. The first act was the country's partial payment to those who
"made the greater economic sacrifice and every other kind of sacrifice than
the rest of us .... " during World War II.' The last two acts were de-
signed to provide America with the necessary scientists, technicians and
teachers to preserve the country's freedom." To accomplish these objec-
tives, the federal government gave those who qualified grants and loans
so that they could afford to attend college; the government also gave the
colleges and universities funds to provide the necessary classrooms, teachers,
and equipment to accommodate the increased influx of students. Although
ostensibly designed as a pre- or post-payment for direct service rendered
to the country, the acts effectively furnished to a larger segment of society
a greater opportunity to attend institutions of higher education.
The Higher Education Act of 1965 continued this objective with three
major changes. No longer would payment for service to the country serve
as the only reason for extending educational benefits to Americans.1T Edu-
cation has become one of the freedoms which the country guarantees its
11 Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation Act 1969, §
411, 82 Stat. 995 (1969). [hereinafter cited as Dept. of Labor, and HEW, 1969]; Independent
Offices and Department of Housing and Urban Development Appropriations Act, 1969, tit. I
National Science Foundation, 82 Stat 946 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Independent Office Act);
Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1969, § 540, 82 Stat. 1136 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Dept. of Defense, 1969]; National Aeronautic and Space Administration Authoriza-
tion Act, 1969, § 1(h), 82 Stat. 281 (1969) [hereinafter cited as NASAA Act]. The H. E.
Amends and the above Acts except for NASAA will be referred to as the student unrest provi-
sions or provisions.
12 Ch. 268, tit. IV § 400 et seq., 58 Stat. 287 (1944). See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (1959) for
Korean Conflict veterans educational benefits.
13 Ch. 171, 64 Stat. 144 (1950) [hereinafter cited as N.S.F.A.].
14 72 Stat. 1580 (1958) [hereinafter cited as NDEA].
15 New York Times, June 23, 1944, at 32, col. 3 (Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt's Address upon
signing the bill).
16 NDEA § 101, 72 Stat. § 1581 (1958); NSFA § 3, 64 Stat. 149-50 (1950).
17See H. R. REP. No. 143, 89th Cong., 1st sess. 1, 2 (1965).
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inhabitants; everyman, everywhere should be free to develop his talents
to their fullest potential.18
Secondly, quality rather than quantity of education is stressed. The
creators of the "Great Society" recognized that equal educational oppor-
tunity does not stem solely from equal access to schools of higher educa-
tion, but mainly from the availability of effective schooling at all levels of
education.19 Thus special attention was given to marginal schools and
students. The best examples of this concern are the head start and finan-
cial aid to student programs. The head start program acquaints the child
of a low income family with his environment. This process prepares him
for the educational process.2 0  The aid program provides him with the
means and incentive to utilize this process. 21 Instead of finding the edu-
cational process abruptly ended at the twelfth grade, when he has the
ability to continue, the child is now assured early in his high school ca-
reer that a college education is possible 2
2
Thirdly, the aid comes in three forms: scholarship grants, loans, and
work-studies.23  The former is probably the most important means of ob-
taining the act's objective of removing or at least diminishing financial
capability as a prerequisite for admission to a college or university.24 The
loan program requires the student to incur indebtness on the prospect of
obtaining an education which will enable him to repay the debt. To a
student from a poverty stricken family, such a prospect may not be real-
istic. This is especially true where the family needs the student as a new
wage earner.
The work-study program has the same drawback for the poverty fam-
ily. It calls for lengthening the school period which means lengthening
the student's period of dependency upon the family. In addition, the time
needed for study is spent working. However, scholarship grants allow
the student to attend school without increasing his indebtedness.
As with other programs involving federal and state cooperation, Con-
gress has delegated the responsibility for managing the financial assistance
program to the individual colleges and universities.2 r The federal role is
to fund the program and to check that guidelines are followed. The main
18 Pres. Johnson's Educational Message to Congress, New York Times, Feb. 6, 1968, at 26,
col. 1.
19 See Pres. Johnson's Educational message to Congress, New York Times, Jan. 13, 1956,
at 20, col. 2.
20 H. R. REP. No. 143, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (1965).
21 1-. R. REP. No. 621, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1965).
22 Higher Education Act of 1965 § 408, 79 Star. 1235 (1965), as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. §
1068 (1969). Commissioner of Education is authorized to make contracts for the identifica-
tion of financially needy children and the publication of the forms of aid.
23 Id. § 401 et seq., 79 Star. 1232 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 1061 (1968).
24 S. RE,. No. 673, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-48 (1965).
2
rHigher Education Act of 1965 § 404 (b), 79 Star. 1233 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 1064(b)(1968).
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guideline is that educational institutions have to pick recipients on the ba-
sis of need and not on the basis of I.Q. or amount of service to the country.
When the number of applicants exceeds the available funds the individual
college is allowed to establish additional criteria for the selection of recip-
ients:2
Of particular importance to schools was the Congressional admonition
against federal intervention into school matters. Section 804 of the Higher
Education Act explicitly states that the federal government could exercise
no "direction, supervision, or control over the curriculum, program of in-
struction, administration, or personnel of any educational institution."z
The recent student unrest legislation contradicts at the least the spirit
of section 804 when it demands that the universities terminate the recip-
ient's aid upon perpetration of certain proscribed acts. And it is dear that
Congress fully intended this result. Congress wanted to exercise direction,
supervision, and a certain amount of control over the universities' handling
of the campus disorders.28 Congressional action appears to arise from a
proclaimed desire to exercise responsible Congressional control over fed-
eral expenditures. The lawmakers thought it irresponsible to provide
federal funds to student participants in unlawful collegiate disturbances.
Because Congress apprehended this to be misuse of the tax dollar, it deter-
mined to correct this abuse by channeling funds to those who will better
utilize the money.29 Thus Congress chose mandatory restrictions upon aid
as the remedy, not because it was the best, but because it was the only remedy
it felt it had.20 There exists little authority or precedent for Congressional
intervention in university disciplinary matters; and any such intervention
may cause more problems than it would solve, not the least of which
would be deterioration of the government-university relationship. The
student unrest provisions, therefore, are a compromise between the urge
for direct federal intervention in campus disorders and the realization that
campus disturbances are beyond Congress' ability to control. Congressman
Pike probably best expressed Congress' frustration when he said:
• . . [My children] can do anything they want at college. They can tie
2 6 Id.
27 79 Stat 1270 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 1144 (1968).
28 The original Senate Bill 3769 declared that the university could refuse to award, continue
or extend any financial assistance, but the House and the final version make it mandatory that
the university deny the aid. 114 CONG. REC. 9054-55 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1968) (Student un-
rest provisions).
29 114 CONG. REC. 3570 (daily ed. May 9, 1968) (remarks by Congressman Scherle); Id.
at H 3569 (remarks by Congressman Gross) (Dept. of HEW could not stop graduate students
from donating part of their monthly NDEA checks to anti-war organization); Id. at 3564
(remarks by Congressman Pike) (Congress should provide the university administration with
some new criteria so that some "worthy people" are not deprived of loans because of the lack of
funds, while unworthy people receive aid).
30 S. REP. No. 1387, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1968); New York Times, Feb. 16, 1969,
at 1, col. 6.
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up the dean.... They can steal papers out of the [dean's] office. They
can do anything because I am physically unable to prevent them. My son
can beat me up, and my daughter is too old for spanking. But if they do
these things they are not going to do them at my expense. They are going
to do them at their own expense .... 1
The Congressional solutions, in detail, have three basic forms.2 The
first form is section 504 (a) of the Higher Education Act which requires:
If an institution of higher education determines, after affording notice
and opportunity for hearing to an individual attending, or employed by,
such institution, that such individual has been convicted by any court of
record of any crime which was committed after the date of... this Act
and which involved the use of (or assistance to others in the use of) force,
disruption, or the seizure of property... [of any university] ... to prevent
officials or students in such institution from engaging in their duties or
pursuing their studies, and that such crime was of a serious nature and
contributed to a substantial disruption of the administration of the insti-
tution . .. then the institution . . . shall deny for a period of two years
[financial aid]. [Also] any institution which such individual subse-
quently attends shall deny for the remainder of the two year period any
[federal aid].a3
The second form is section 504 (b) of the Higher Education Act
which requires:
If an institution of higher education determines, after affording notice
and opportunity for hearing ... [the] individual has willfully refused to
obey a lawful regulation or order of [the] institution after the date . . .
of this Act, and such refusal was of a serious nature and contributed to a
substantial disruption of the administration of such institution, then such
institution shall deny, for a period of two years [federal financial aid]. 34
The third form is section 411 of Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare Appropriational Act, which requires:
No part of the funds appropriated under this Act shall be used to pro-
vide a loan, guarantee of a loan or a grant to any applicant ... convicted
... of any crime which involves the use of ... force, trespass or the sei-
zure of property . . . to prevent officials or students . . . from engaging
in their duties or pursuing their studies.3 5
From the legislative history of the acts, it seems that Congress wanted
the university to take "immediate" retaliatory action against the rioters by
discontinuing all sources of federal finance. To accomplish this purpose,
31 114 CONG. REC. 3564 (remarks by Congressman Pike).
32 U.S. Office of Educ., Bureau of Higher Educ., Higher Education Reports, Jan. 28, 1969,
1-3 [hereinafter cited as Higher Educ. Rep.).
33 H. E .Amends tit. V. § 504a. Pub. L. No. 90-575, 82 Stat. 1062 (1968).
34 Id. § 504(b), 82 Star. 1062 (1968); The Independent Office Act, note 11 supra, contains
similar language.
35 Pub. L. No. 90-557, 82 Stat. 995 (1968). Dept. of Defense Act, note 11 supra, con-
tains similar language.
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yet staying within constitutional limitation, it would appear to be neces-
sary to interpret the acts as complementary. Section 411's lack of proce-
dural due process safeguards would be corrected if read in pari materia
with section 504 (a) and (b). Thus a section 411 withdrawal of aid
would become mandatory only after notice and a hearing. Conversely, as
under section 411, the holding of section 504 (a) and (b) hearings would
be mandatory upon the commission of a proscribed act.3 6
However, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare offi-
cials, in an effort to maximize university's discretion, have emphasized a
literal interpretation of the provisions. The Department perceives the
acts to be independent of one another and generally applicable to different
situations.3 7  This approach emphasizes the disparities present in the acts.
Under the Department's interpretation, a discontinuance of aid under sec-
tion 504(a) and (b) becomes mandatory only if the university makes the
specified determinations, whereas under section 411 the discontinuance is
automatic upon conviction for the designated crimes. The determinations
of section 504 are not mandatory, thus enabling the university to circum-
vent the consequences of section 504 by disciplining under traditional pro-
cedures. Other distinguishing features pointed out by the Department are
the following: section 504 acts need to be "of a serious nature" and "con-
tribute to a substantial disruption" while section 411 acts do not; section
411 becomes operative when a "court of general jurisdiction," as opposed
to "any court of record" in section 504(a), tenders a guilty verdict, and
not after the student has exhausted his appeal rights.,
But section 411 lacks section 504's prerequisites of notice and hearing
by the institution of higher education and a substantial nexus between the
crime and the disruption,"9 thus, opening it to due process and vagueness
attack. For that reason, this article will treat section 411 in the only
possible practical manner, i.e., in conjunction with section 504 as though
it incorporated the procedural safeguards of notice and hearing and a
more careful description of the proscribed acts. In this treatment of the
basic sections of the Congressional legislation, this article, therefore, di-
verges from the official administrative interpretation in a belief that the
Congressional purpose will be thereby more closely achieved while guard-
ing the student's constitutional rights.
8
6 A more practical reason for construing the acts as being complementary is that § 411 does
not specify who is to cut off the aid-the government or the university-while § 504 explicitly
requires the university to do so. Most commentators perceive this omission as a selection of
the government as the cut off agent. However, the latter has no means of determining who is
an aid recipient since the aid is distributed in lump sums to the university. See New York
Times, March 23, 1969, at 54, col. 6-7 (city ed.).
37 Cohen, A Statement on Student Unrest and Federal Legislation 3 (statement by the Sec'y
of HEW, Jan. 15, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Cohen, A Statement on Student Unrest).
38 Id. at 3-4; Higher Educ. Rep. at 2-4.
3 9 Cohen, A Statement on Student Unrest at 4.
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Colleges and universities, however, find the provisions objectionable
no matter which interpretation is adopted. Their main complaint is that
the provisions convert probation into automatic expulsion only because the
student involved happens to be an aid recipient.40 This is a direct result
of the student unrest provisions' failure to distinguish between acts that
merit probation and those that merit dismissal. In their area of coverage,
the provisions destroy the flexibility of the traditional university discipline
procedure which permits a variety of punitive responses depending upon
the severity of the offense and previous record of the student. A uni-
versity might wish to place an aid recipient on probation, but the legisla-
tion requires abrupt termination of aid thereby removing the means of
university attendance. So in many circumstances, the university reasons,
a recipient of aid will be expelled for his poverty and not for his conduct
which only merited probation.41  And correspondingly a richer student
guilty of the same misconduct would continue his education on probation.
However, since probation may, under current discretionary university ad-
ministration of federal funds, serve as a basis for withdrawal or refusal of
aid, the logic of the university's reasoning bears closer scrutiny.
Therefore, the actual reason for the antagonism against the student
unrest provisions may be the institutions' fear of the consequences of this
form of federal encroachment. Although allegedly recognizing the inde-
pendence of educational institutions, 42 the legislation undercuts that inde-
pendence through its decision that the institutions have failed to control
their students, so Congress will have to do it.43  But can Congress stop
disorders from Washington? Discretion and flexibility in the response of
university officials to student disorders are needed. The importance of
such discretion and flexibility is illustrated by the recollection that Colum-
bia University's worse incidents arose from student resentment of discrim-
inatory discipline.44 But the provisions limit such freedom of action.
Also the institutions may be afraid that submission to federal interven-
tion would augur a surrender of their autonomy.4" This fear might not be
as unfounded as one would wish, especially in the light of the implication
in President Nixon's educational statement that if the present provisions
are not enforced by the college and university more repressive legislation
or action might result.46
40 Id, at 6; New York Times, Feb. 16, 1969, at 60, col. 5.
41 Cohen, A Stateement on Student Unrest at 6; 114 CONG. REC. 10398-99 (daily ed. Sept.
6, 1968).
42 See text accompanying note 27 supra.
43 See 114 CONG, REc 10395-401.
44 Report of the Fact Finding Commission Appointed to Investigate the Disturbances at
Columbia University in April and May 1968 95-98 (Vintaged ed. 1968).
4 5 See New York Times, March 17, 1969, at 29 col. 5-6.
46 See id., March 23, 1969, at 54, col. 4 (Pres. Nixon's address on disorders); id. March 17,
1969, at 29, col. 5.
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While these considerations demonstrate the undesirability and possible
infeasibility of federal intervention, they do not necessarily establish
grounds for invalidating the provisions on constitutional grounds.47 The
most often stated constitutional argument against the provisions is the
vagueness doctrine. This doctrine consists of two constitutional principles:
vagueness or indefiniteness and chilling effect or overbreadth. 8
The United States Supreme Court in Connally v. General Construction
Company,4' while interpreting a penal statute, developed a vagueness test
requiring a statute to explicitly inform every ordinary person within its
purview of the nature of the conduct proscribed. This test should apply
to the unrest provision limitations upon aid whether considered penal or
civil in nature since vagueness does not depend upon the penalty but the
obedience to a rule or standard that is so indefinite to be really no rule or
standard at all.50 The Connally rule requires that the words used in the
statute establish a standard of behavior which is not dependent upon the
varying impressions of the trier of fact whether the trier be a jury51 or a
public official.52 Thus the words used must have either a fixed meaning,
statutory or judicial definition, or be susceptible to interpretation through
the use of legitimate aids to construction.53
The importance of the existence of a viable external standard is that
it prevents the statute from being given an ex post facto construction by
the person implementing it. Thus, the vagueness or indefiniteness prin-
ciple is a procedural due process safeguard. It requires that fair notice of
the prohibitted conduct be given to those who wish to avoid the statute's
penalties. It also requires that proper standards for adjudication of guilt
exist.5
But the vagueness doctrine serves a more important function than re-
quiring statutes to have standards from which men of common intelli-
gence55 can interpret the consequences of their behavior.56  It has a sub-
47 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (Court does not void legislation
on the ground that it is unwise); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (determining the wisdom or evil of a law is legislature's
function).
48 Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 951-53 (N.D. IMI., 1968) (case contains numerous ci-
tations). See Collins, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L. REV. 195
(1955). Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963).
49 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
50 Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n., 286 U.S. 210, 243 (1932).
51 Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 395 (1926).
52 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1941).
53 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
54 Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 951 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
55 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
56 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doc.
trine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75-76, 80-81, 96-104 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Void-for-Vagueness).
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stantive due process aspect.57  Through the principle of chilling effect or
overbreadth, it protects the peripheries of the Bill of Rights' freedoms
without a case by case review of the statute's coverage or reach." Statutes
with broad applications have inhibiting effects on the personal liberties,r"
thus making them susceptible to sweeping and improper application."
Since such statutes could deter exercise of constitutional rights as effec-
tively as an explicit prohibiting statute,61 the courts demand a precision of
regulation coupled with a precision of objective to prevent the perversion
of the statute for some illegitimate purpose.6 2  This is especially true in
the first amendment area.6 3 Narrowness of the statute's scope is so impor-
tant that the courts allow a person whose personal activities might be sub-
ject to legitimate regulation to question a statute's broadness. 4
Anthony Amsterdam, in an often cited article, suggested four factors
that should be considered when attempting to decide whether a court
should find a statute to be a threat to personal liberties: (1) the nature of
individual freedom menaced, (2) the probability of the statute violating
that freedom, (3) the deterent effect of the statute, and (4) the practical
power of a court to supervise the use of the statute. 5
When applied to the provisions, Amsterdam's factors indicate that the
court should not invoke the void-for-vagueness doctrine. The student
unrest provisions affect a fundamental right-freedom of speech-since
the "penumbra" of the First Amendment includes academic freedom.66
Academic freedom, like free speech, is based upon the assumption that
society needs to have unfettered exchange of ideas.67 College and univer-
sity campuses function as the "marketplace" for this exchange of ideas.68
On the campuses, the prejudices and preconceptions of the past clash with
the evaluations and theories of tomorrow.69  Since effective exchange of
ideas may arouse and excite students,70 schools (and governments) may be
57 .andry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 951 (N.D. IlM. 1968).
GsKeyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 601-04 (1967); Note, Void-for-Vagueness
at 75.
59 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (citing with approval Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's opinion in Wieman v. Updergraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952)).
O NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963).
61 Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959).
62NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435-36 (1963).
31id. at 432.
64 Dombrovski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
Note, Void-for-Vagueness, note 56 supra, at 94.
6oKeyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
07 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
6
sKeyishiaa v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
69 Cf. Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
70 Id. at 4-5; See Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
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inclined to avoid this confrontation through prohibitory regulations and
rules. But they can not exclude this confrontation merely because the
orderly program of education may be disturbed.7 1 Limitations on free
trade of ideas for the sake of order and the status quo can cause distrust
and suspicion which in turn will diminish the open-mindedness necessary
for independent inquiry.72 More importantly, society depends upon the
free discussion to make government responsive to the will of the people
and thereby provide for peaceful social transformation.7
Yet even the penumbra of the First Amendment does not prohibit
precisely worded restrictions on speech conduct. These restrictions, how-
ever, must occur as a consequence of a "legitimate," 74 "proper," 75 "ma-
terial," 78 "reasonable," 77 "substantial,"78 or "compelling," 79 government in-
terest in regulating speech conduct. In United States v. O'Brien, Mr. Chief
Justice Warren attempted to reduce the inherent imprecision in the terms
used to describe a lawful government interest. He stated that a govern-
mental regulation is justified when (1) the regulation is within the con-
stitutional power of the government; (2) the regulation furthers an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; (4) the incidental restric-
tion of First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.80
The "substantial" governmental interest involved in the student un-
rest provisions is a properly functioning school."' Congress has declared
that higher education is vital to both the Nation and the individual. For
this reason, it has exercised its power to spend for the general welfare in
order to provide Americans with this twentieth century necessity. Congress
has also declared that the disturbances-disruptions, seizures, and tres-
passes-which plague American campuses jeopardize the Congressional
program. Further, Congress stated that the perpetrators of such acts were
71 See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 508-09
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist.].
72 Cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344,
U.S. 183, 196-98 (1952).
73 Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365
(1937).
74 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
75 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
76Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ, 273 F. Supp. 613, 618 (MD Ala. 1967); Burn-
side v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
77 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969); Blackwell v. Issaque
County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1966).
78Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
79NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 538 (1968).
80 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
81 See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist, 393 U.S. 503 (1968); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295
F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
[Vol. 31
COMMENTS
unsuitable for aid assistance.82 In summary, the Congressional argument
is that the student unrest provisions are designed to protect the financial
interest of the United States and to promote the purposes of educational
legislation. Although the financial interest of the United States when bal-
anced against the individual's First Amendment rights may be weak, the
governmental interest in promoting education should be as strong as any
governmental interest involved in the picketing and licensing cases.'
If the student unrest provisions infringe upon conduct that symbol-
izes the beliefs and attitudes of the actor,8 but which do not "break down
the regimentation of the classroom" 5-the compelling or substantial gov-
ernmental purpose-the amendments would violate the First Amend-
ment." But these acts are aimed at only unlawful and violent conduct de-
signed to prevent or substantially disrupt the functions of the university; 87
so, they will be valid, unless found to sweep too broadly. 8
The sweep of a statute encompasses Mr. Amsterdam's second and third
factors-the probability that the statute could be used to violate a freedom
or used to deter permitted behavior. The issue becomes whether or not
the provision could be used to deter students from engaging in protected
conduct. The answer should be no. The provision states with enough
clarity the prohibited conduct. In sections 504(a) and 411, the words
"force," "trespass," "seizure," and "disruption" are used. The first three
words have definite legal definitions so students could with a degree of
certainty decide what acts or behavior to avoid.8 Only "disruption,"
which is used in section 504(a), could be considered ambiguous and there-
by afford its enforcer the opportunity to deter permissible student con-
ductY0 This ambiguity could be dispelled by reading the word in con-
junction with the rest of the subparagraph and with section 411.91 A
second method for clarifying the ambiguity would be for the court, when
first construing the statute, to give the word the necessary precision. 2
Another problem is the subsequent requirement that the act committed
8 2 See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra.
83 See 8huttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). The Higher Education
Act of 1968 authorized the Commissioner of Education to protect the interest of the United
States and promote the purposes of the act through contract provisions. § 407 (a) (6), 79 Stat.
1235 (1965), 20 U.S.C.A. § 1067(a)(b) (1968).
84 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943).
8 5See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist, 393 U.S. 503 (1968); Burnside v. Byars, 363
F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1963).
80West Virginia State Bd. of Educ v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
87 See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1968).
88Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965); NAACP v. Button 371 U.S. 415, 432-33
(1963); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 985 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
8 9 See Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 954 (N.D. I1. 1968).
90 But see Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1968).
9 1 Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 956 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
92 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
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be "of a serious nature and contributed to a substantial disruption ......
of the school's administration. This phrase appears in sections 504(a)
and (b). Although "serious" and "substantial" have no precise meaning,
this imprecision should not be fatal to the provisions. The phrase does not
describe the prohibited acts, but rather it limits the scope of the provi-
sions." The trier of fact decides what resulted from the commission of
the proscribed acts. If the result was less than a "substantial disruption"
-a factual question-the student involved does not lose his aid assistance.
Anthony Amsterdam's final factor is practicability of court supervi-
sion of the use of the statute. Where the court does not have the means
to supervise, it often employs the doctrine of vagueness as a means of se-
curing jurisdiction."' Since the court, through the use of 42 U.S.C. section
1983 and 28 U.S.C. section 1343, has the review power over university
'disciplinary action, 5 it does not need to use vagueness to guard against
improper application of the provisions.
The application of Anthony Amsterdam's factors to the student unrest
provisions suggest that a court should not invoke the void-for-vagueness
doctrine. But before a court makes any decision, it should consider three
other points. First, the provision specifies that the college and university
officials are to make the determinations that the student has lost the privi-
lege of being an aid recipient. These officials will make this determina-
tion whether or not the provisions are validated. The important question
is what due process rights does a student have when that determination
is made. The provision affords him the rights that are given a student
when being expelled."
Secondly, the provisions define the prohibited acts in relation to the
university's need for order. Do university officials, when making the de-
termination, define the prohibited acts in relation to the institution's need
for order? Or, in other words, is there a viable external standard which
guides the official when he makes disciplinary decisions? The university
student disciplinary code could provide this standard. The state legisla-
ture when creating the university as a legal entity usually delegates to its
governing body full responsibility for the university. 7 That board in turn
promulgates basic rules and regulations while delegating to the university
administration the authority to make more specific rules or regulations in-
volving the procedural nature of university discipline. These regulations,
although not presently written to reflect a distinction between substantial
93 Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 956 (N.D. IMI. 1968).
9 4 Note, Void-for-Vagueness, note 56 supra, at 109-115.
9 5E.g., Butny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 282 (D. Col. 1968).
96 Compare text accompanying notes 37-39 supra, with Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.
150 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
9 7 See OmIo REv. CODE ANN §§ 1713.02, 1713.08, 3335.01 et seq. (Page Supp. 1968).
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and non-substantial disturbances, could and should be used to place limita-
tions upon the discretionary actions of administrators.
However in the area of student behavior, the codes of regulation pro-
mulgated by the universities are usually all encompassing rules couched in
broad comprehensive language.9s Designed to preserve "good order" and
the university's "fair name," 99 these codes emphasize the averting of un-
conventional activity rather than the promoting of free inquiry and evalu-
ation, the purpose for which the institutions were created.100 Tradition-
ally, the courts have granted the universities' community immunity from
these requirements and given them wide latitude in the exercise of aca-
demic and disciplinary discretion.1' 1  One commentator attributes the
courts' reluctance to strike down a university administrator's judgment as
an extension of the deference to the expertise of the educator in the aca-
demic realm to the conduct area.10 2 A district court judge recently found
a different rationale for upholding broad student regulations when he de-
clared that "detailed codes of prohibited student conduct are provocative
... [therefore] should not be employed in higher education."'0 3  But this
judgment was explicitly rejected in Soglin v. KauHman.04 The judge in
that case accepted the American Association of University Professors' view
that student codes need to be "dear and explicit."
The Soglin decision was not a radical step. Courts have long held
that the universities can not act arbitrarily and unreasonably.105 More re-
cently in Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., the courts have required the
universities to protect the procedural due process rights of its students by
providing them with notice of a cause for dismissal and a hearing to pre-
sent their side. 06 Also, they have barred the university from infringing
upon the student's basic constitutional values,'"T especially (although per-
haps not exclusively) First Amendment rights. 08 The judge in Soglin
just declared that a vague code violated such values.0 9
98 Note, Uncertainty in College Disciplinary Regulation, 29 Ohio L.J. 1023, 1023-24 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Uncertainty].
90 Samson v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146, 147, 167 N.Y.S. 202, 204, aff'd,
181 App. Div. 936, 167 N.Y.S. 1125 (1912).
100 See, e.g., Jones v. Tennessee State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 195 (M.D. Tenn.
1968); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ. 130 Misc. 249, 259, 223 N.Y.S. 798, 807-08, rev'd, 224
App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928); Samson v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146,
147, 167 N.Y.S. 202, 204, aff'd, 181 App. Div. 936, 167 N.Y.S. 1125 (1912).
101 Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
102 Note, Uncertainty, note 98 supra, at 1024.
103 Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622, 630 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
104 Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
105 Anthony v .Syracuse Univ., 130 Misc. 249, 258, 223 N.Y.S. 796, 808 (1927), rev'd
on different interpretation of the facts 224 App. Div. 487, 491, 231 N.Y.S. 435, 440 (1928).
106294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1961).
1o7 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
108 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist, 393 U.S. 503 (1968).
109 Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. - (W.D. Wis. 1968).
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Thirdly, and probably most importantly, the court should remember
that if the country is to provide every child with the opportunity to attend
college, more colleges, laboratories, libraries, teachers, etc., will be
needed.110 The federal government through Congress will have to finance
the program."' Will a Congress that can not control the use of its money
through the student unrest provisions provide the funds needed for a uni-
versal higher education program?
The doctrine of vagueness as a due process safeguard protects the in-
dividual from the overreach of governmental action by requiring that
statutes which might possibly infringe upon free speech be narrowly
drawn and intended to serve a substantial state interest. Particularly in
the area of education this protection is necessary if educational institutions
are to continue to serve society as the market place for new ideas. Dissent
and non-conformity are essential characteristics of a flourishing university.
This clash of ideas that takes place within the university informs the Amer-
ican society of the injustices and inequalities which need to be corrected.
To bar such dissent would be a perpetuation of these social ills.
At the same time educational institutions need to protect themselves
from those that would ravish or pervert their function. The university
should neither be the megaphone nor the political basis for the most vocal
or violent group-whether it be from the right or left.
Although the student unrest provision usurps part of the university's
discretion in disciplinary matters, which is a violation of the unwritten
amendment of separation of state and education, they do recognize the
need to distinguish between dissent and disruption-allowing the former
and prohibiting the latter. And since they rely upon the university con-
duct codes for their definiteness, they compel the codes to make a similar
distinction. Thus the student unrest provision makes dear to the univer-
sities the need for definite codes and to state legislatures the form which
anti campus disorder legislation should take.
Joseph J. Cox
110 Note, College Education as a Legal Necessity, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1400, 1407 (1965).
"llCommission on Education and Labor, Federal Aid to Higher Education 5 (1967):
Amt. (in millions) %
Federal Assistance Programs 1,581 70.6
State Scholarships 98 4.4
Institutional Programs 513 22.8
Foundations and Corporations 50 2.2
TOTAL 2,242 100.0
See Wall Street Journal, Aug. 19, 1968, at 1 col. 1. (talk about the effects of federal cutbacks
on education).
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